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Abstract. Inserting citations to authorities into a text, in order to increase the persuasive power of it, and prove the 
competence of the author, has a long tradition in science and in law. The question is whether this also applies to 
judicial decisions. This question is especially interesting in a continental legal culture, where following previous 
cases is not obligatory, there is no stare decisis, and therefore, inserting a reference to a previous case may have a 
different function. In 2012 we performed a computer-based citation analysis of the court decisions published under 
FOI act on the offi cial website of the National Offi ce for the Judiciary (Országos Bírósági Hivatal). The article 
contains four sections. The fi rst and the second sections are dealing with citations within judicial decisions in 
general, and their signifi cance in different legal cultures. The third section is about the quantitative, while the 
fourth is about the qualitative part of the research, and tackle the issue whether citations increase the quality of 
judicial reasoning or not. The answer will be limited to the Hungarian legal culture.
Keywords: case law (in Hungary), citations to previous cases, computer based analysis of legal decisions, 
Hungarian judicial system, judicial reasoning (in Hungary)
1. INTRODUCTION
Inserting citations to authorities into a text, in order to increase the persuasive power of it, 
and prove the competence of the author, has a long tradition in science and in law. Though 
the quality of a scientifi c article depends on many factors, one spectacular element is 
apparently the number of citations. The question is whether this also applies to judicial 
decisions. This question is especially interesting in a continental legal culture, where 
following previous cases is not obligatory, there being no stare decisis, and therefore, 
inserting a reference to a previous case may have a different function. This may be done in 
order to refl ect on the parties’ reasoning, to demonstrate the ‘long standing judicial practice’, 
or the ‘unifi ed application of law’, or to increase the persuasiveness of the reasoning 
towards the higher courts or the general public.
In 2012 we performed a computer-based citation analysis of the court decisions 
published under FOI act1 on the offi cial website of the National Offi ce for the Judiciary 
(Országos Bírósági Hivatal).The database at that time consisted of a little more than 60,000 
Hungarian judicial decisions in electronic format.2
1  The Act on Electronic Freedom of Information (Act XC. of 2005. § 16.) introduced the 
Collection of Judicial Decisions, and publication was started in 2007. Recently the Act on the 
Organisation and Administration of Courts (Act CLXI. of 2011. § 163.) is regulating the issue. 
2  http://www.birosag.hu/ugyfelkapcsolati-portal/anonim-hatarozatok-tara
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The method was very simple. A citation in a database3 is a hyperlink. A hyperlink 
always has a starting point in a document and has an end point in another document. 
Documents have different descriptive data, called metadata, like date (year) of issue, issuing 
court, issuing chamber (department), subject matter of the decision, judge, parties’ 
counsellors, and so on. The documents at the end of the hyperlink also have these data. 
With the help of these metadata one could produce statistics from different angles 
discovering the citation patterns within the corpus.
We have not analyzed all citation types in all documents. Basically we restricted the 
scope of our research to two fi elds. The fi rst restriction is that our raw material comprised 
only the 60,000 non-edited judgments: we excluded the edited judgments from the analysis, 
and we counted the inserted hyperlinks (starting point of the hyperlinks) only in this pile. 
The other restriction is that we counted hyperlinks only if they pointed to edited4 cases, 
published by the Supreme Court itself, and in some commercial case reporting journals. 
With these restrictions we were able to observe the everyday practice of judicial work, and 
avoided some technical problems.5 Finally, apart from the computer based analysis we also 
conducted manual research on 520 case samples, where we registered additional aspects of 
citations that otherwise could not have been detected, like style and context of the citation. 
This part we called the qualitative part.
This article contains four sections. The following second section deals with citations 
within judicial decisions in general, and their signifi cance in different legal cultures. The 
third section relates to the quantitative aspects of the research, while the fourth is about the 
qualitative part of the research, both containing tables and charts, together with interim 
conclusions. At the end of the fourth section I will briefl y tackle the issue indicated in the 
title of this article: do citations increase the quality of judicial reasoning? The answer will 
be limited to the Hungarian legal culture.
2. THE IMPORTANCE OF CITATIONS
Citations have a long history in- and outside the law. The fi rst law which dealt with the 
topic was the Lex Citationis (Law of Citations) from the post-classical period of Roman 
Law. It declared the writings of fi ve roman jurists authoritative: Gaius, Modestinus, 
Papinian, Paul, and Ulpian, and set up a process if opinions are dissenting.6 Whatever the 
reason for the birth of the law, it clearly shows that references to authorities played an 
important role in the judicial process, and the emperors wanted to control this.
3  Since the offi cial database is built up from rich text fi les, it contains no hyperlinks. Therefore 
we used for the research a commercial legal database (OptiJUS) containing exactly the same items, in 
a metadated, and hyperlinked format. Special thanks to Opten Ltd., and its CTO Tamás Grósz, for 
helping me to prepare the queries and the statistics. 
4  Editing basically means two operations: adding a headnote and shortening the decision, 
deleting all the circumstances and texts that have no further relevance to the development of law. 
(Like technical details of the costs of procedure, dates, and names, etc.) 
5  Like the problem of separating the technical citations, citing the case numbers belonging to 
the case history). 
6  A law issued in 426 A.D. by emperor Theodosian and Valentinian. For an analysis of the Lex 
Citationis see: Watson (2000) 5. For a recent analysis: Austin (2010) 19. 
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At the end of the 19th century the number of published cases in the USA increased so 
rapidly that it caused turbulence in several fi elds.7Since there was no pre-selection during 
publishing, (commercial publishers were driven by profi t, and increasing output), an 
enormous number of decisions were printed. The control of the texts (fi nding and evaluating 
them), separating the insignifi cant decisions from important precedents, and “good” law 
from “bad” became harder and harder. This was the reason for the emergence of the 
citators.8 These books were basically huge tables that showed the references to a particular 
case, and also described the context of a citation. Context primarily meant positive or 
negative context, followed or overruled. The best known amongst these citators was the 
Shepard, which began in 1875. The Shepard is based on a very simple idea: the more a case 
is cited in a positive context the more important it is.9
When this same increase in quantity became a problem, and as a result a “control 
crisis”10 emerged concerning the scientifi c articles, the method of Shephard was utilized by 
Eugene Garfi eld,11 a librarian and scientometrist. He created the Science Citation Index, 
which later became the basis of Impact Factor, a widely used method of measuring the 
impact of a scientifi c work. The primary method for measuring the importance of an article, 
a publication forum (journal), or a scientist is still based on citations.12The third domain 
where the number of citations and the citing authority has a great signifi cance is search 
engines.13
7  Mr. John West, the founder of the West Publishing Company himself regards this incidence as 
a turning point in the history of law reports. West (1909–1910) 45.
8  There were, of course, other means of controlling the texts, like new types of indices, the 
uniform numbering of cases, and the efforts of establishing a centralized law reporter instead of the 
“multiplicity of reports.” West (1909–1910) 7, 5.
9  Bast (1998) 41. 
10  The word comes from the seminal book by Beniger (1986).
11  “What is the prospect in scientifi c literature? The last published edition of the World List of 
Scientifi c Periodicals contained more than 50,000 titles in science and technology. It is variously 
estimated that between 1 and 3 million new scientifi c articles are published each year.” Garfi eld 
(1955) 108–111. http://garfi eld.library.upenn.edu/essays/v6p468y1983.pdf, and later in a video 
interview told: “People don’t even simply know this: there was no citation index at that time for larger 
rules. It came later. That came out, that Shepard produced that citation index long before we started 
SCI, because librarians started to complain, that why don’t they have a citation index for journals. 
(…) And I went down to the reference room, and that’s when I saw what Shepard Citation was, and I 
literally screamed, (…) When I saw Shepard, I realized, that the index had to be inverted, because 
they had the document as the focus, and the statements to be followed.” http://www.webofstories.
com/play/eugene.garfi eld/25;jsessionid=1C696C9302267E140AE26CB1273D2833
12 Though since then other methods (like counting the downloads) has emerged, the core of the 
idea is still the same. A separate journal is devoted to this specifi c topic, called Scientometrics, 
(published by Akadémiai Kiadó and SpringerNature) http://link.springer.com/journal/11192
13 The frequency and the context of references, as well as the importance of the citing authorities 
is a very important (if not the most important) part of the Google-algorithm, PageRank (see: http://
searchengineland.com/what-is-google-pagerank-a-guide-for-searchers-webmasters-11068#defi nition). 
Search engines before Google were all based on free-text search and meta-tags put on webpages. 
However, it turned out that the data published on the internet is just too much, and cannot be controlled 
through these two ways. The new method was to use the measurable traces of cognitive authority, 
generated by human knowledge – in other words, hyperlinks and citations. (for this see: Larry Page: 
‘PageRank: Bringing Order to the Web’, https://web.archive.org/web/20020506051802/www-diglib.
stanford.edu/cgi-bin/WP/get/SIDL-WP-1997-0072?1 “The citation graph of the web is an important 
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In 1954 John Merryman, a professor in Stanford Law School published an article, 
where he analyzed the citations in California Supreme Court Decisions.14 There he identifi ed 
several reasons why judges cite authorities.15 The most important ones are the following: 
the idea of predictability and justice (like cases must be decided alike), with the “strong 
drives toward certainty and simplicity”, judges’ intention to demonstrate the government of 
laws, (in contrast to government of men), and fi nally judges’ optimization of workload: the 
use of accumulated wisdom and experience written in previous decisions helps the judge 
not to reconsider the problem from its origins, (which is in connection with the phenomena 
called “inertia”, that a judge may frequently fi nd it easier to cite and rely on authority than 
to think his problem through). Merryman analyzed 298 decisions, with 4917 references, 
and – at the peak of the legal realist movement – he concluded that the selection of 
authorities is more a random process than a conscious one.
(…) (T)he judge recognizes that headnotes from previous decisions, no matter how 
carefully arranged, how accurately copied, how smoothly run together into text, no matter 
how carefully weighed, distilled and condensed into higher abstractions, do not of 
themselves decide cases. They are at best data. If the judicial process is to be a conscious, 
meaningful process the judge must be aware that he selects data, that he formulates 
questions, that he applies doctrine in his own way, that he achieves results, and that the 
decisions in earlier cases play only a small part in the total process.16
This rather skeptical conclusion is strongly debated by Richard Posner and William 
Landes17 in their article in 1976. Their starting point is that the body of legal precedents is a 
“capital stock that yields a fl ow of information services which depreciates over time as new 
conditions arise that were not foreseen by the framers of the existing precedents. New (and 
replacement) capital is created by investment in the production of precedents.” For this 
reason they presuppose that citation is not entirely idiosyncratic, and their article is an 
attempt to prove this hypothesis by demonstrating certain recurring patterns. The article’s 
conclusions, among others, are that subject matter of the case has a huge signifi cance, that 
cases decided by upper courts depreciate slower than those of lower courts, and legislative 
activity depreciates the “precedent-capital” rapidly.
Merryman came back to the topic in 1977, and further developed the theory of citations 
with some valuable new thoughts. He compared the judgments of the California Supreme 
Court from the following three years: 1950, 1960, and 1970.18 One of his most important 
conclusions was that the citation patterns do not change dramatically over time. For 
example, the average number of citations within the decisions stayed between 16 and17. 
His other important conclusion is that the citing power of the decisions strongly decreases 
resource that has largely gone unused in existing web search engines. We have created maps 
containing as many as 518 million of these hyperlinks, a signifi cant sample of the total. These maps 
allow rapid calculation of a web page’s “PageRank”, an objective measurement of its citation 
importance that corresponds well with people’s subjective idea of importance. Because of this 
correspondence, PageRank is an excellent way to prioritize the results of web keyword searches. For 
most popular subjects, a simple text matching search that is restricted to web page titles performs 
admirably when PageRank prioritizes the results.” (Emphasis added – Zs.Z.)
14  Merryman (1953–1954) 613. 
15  Merryman (1953–1954) 621. 
16  Merryman (1953–1954) 673. 
17  Landes and Posner (1976) 249.
18  Merryman (1977–1978) 381.
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over time (50–60% of the citations are to cases decided in the previous decade).19 This fact 
partly supports Posner’s theory of depreciation.
Finally, a recently published article20 dealing with the problem of citations from a 
different angle states: “Citations function something like the currency of the legal system. 
An opinion’s references to authoritative legal materials, most often the Court’s own prior 
decisions, form the fundamental justifi cation for a judicial decision.”21
Citation practice of the common law courts and continental courts strongly differs.22 
While judicial decisions in common law systems are primary sources of law, and the 
principle of stare decisis is a fundamental value, in continental legal systems cases are 
secondary sources (if they are considered as sources of law at all). They only have a 
subsidiary role in reasoning. Furthermore, there are huge differences between continental 
legal systems with regards to their attitude towards judge made law, and as a consequence, 
towards citations. France represents one extreme, because references to previous decisions 
are practically non-existent, while in Germany the number of decisions containing a citation 
to a previous decision – in 1992 – was a little bit less than 50%, and the majority of these 
contain 1–2 citations.23 Hungary seems to be somewhere in between: in 2007 the average 
number of documents containing citations to previous cases was around 30%, but this 
increased to 40% in 2012. Before I try to answer the question posed at the beginning of this 
paper, I will briefl y present the research we have carried out.
3. RESULTS OF THE COMPUTER BASED RESEARCH
3. 1. The structure of the Hungarian court system
The Hungarian court system has four levels. The 111 local courts are the courts of fi rst 
instance. The second level courts are the county courts, of which there are 20 (one in each 
of the 19 counties and the Capital Court). There are also four appellate courts. At the top of 
the judicial system is the Supreme Court called Curia.
Local courts (111 - járásbíróságok, formerly helyi bíróságok) are the courts of fi rst 
instance. Consequently, they are competent in minor issues. There are separate labor and 
administrative courts as courts of fi rst instance but there are only 20 of them. They are all 
located in the county courts’ city.
County courts and Capital Court (20 – törvényszékek, formerly megyei bíróságok) 
decide civil and penal cases having “important” or high value subject matter at the fi rst 
instance and appellate suits in cases begun at the local level. They are the second instance 
courts for administrative and labor issues.
The appellate courts’ (4 – táblabíróságok) main function is to serve as a second 
instance court on cases which were decided at the county level. (Normally local courts are 
19  Merryman (1977–1978) 396. 
20  Cross, Spriggs II, Johnson and Wahlbeck (2010) 489.
21 Over the time a relatively great literature of citation analysis emerged. See e.g.: Johnson 
(1985) 509; Friedman, Kagan, Cartwright and Wheeler (1981) 773; McCormick (1996) 870; Smith: 
(2000) 847. For citation analysis in continental legal systems see e.g. Wagner-Döbler and Philipps 
(1992) 228–242.
22  See e.g. Goutal (1976) 43. 
23  Wagner-Döbler and Philipps (1992) 231. 
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the courts of fi rst instance, so cases started at county level are special because of their 
subject matter – e.g. copyright – or because of the value of the lawsuit.)
All county and appellate courts are organized into three departments and further into 
branches. The main departments are the civil department (subdivided into the normal civil 
branch, which deals with cases between private parties, and the business branch, which 
deals with cases between business organizations); the penal department; and – at the County 
Court – the administrative and labor department (subdivided into an administrative branch, 
dealing with the supervision of the decisions of the administrative organs, and a labor 
branch).
The Supreme Court has a double function: it serves as a Court of Cassation in decided 
cases (as a court of third instance), and has a legal unifi cation role – i.e. its task is to 
monitor the jurisdiction of lower courts, and in case of divergence to issue certain acts.
3.2. The data sets
For the research, we split the data into two parts: to citing and cited documents (precedents). 
Presently, around 500,000 lawsuits are heard per year in Hungarian courts, and around 
11,000 resulting decisions are published. More than 90% of these latter cases are published 
under the FOI act,24 in their unedited, original form; only the data of the parties are deleted 
for privacy reasons from the decisions. This database was the one for the research of the 
citing documents. This database represents the day-to-day practice of the courts in a raw, 
unedited form. From the beginning of the publication of the decisions in 2007 to the time 
this research was completed in 2012, the number of items in this database was 61,512.
Table 1. Unedited judgments (UEJ) in the CJD – Citing documents database
Civil Business Labor Administrative Penal Total 
Supreme Court 4,873 867 1,465 5,496 1,166 13,867
Appellate Courts 9,907 3,548 0 1,172 2,704 17,331
County Courts 10,705 4,297 1,588 7,934 3,066 27,590
Local Courts 1,396 314 0 0 1,014 2,724
Total 26,881 9,026 3,053 14,602 7,950 61,512
In the abovementioned group, we analyzed the citations of “precedents” that are 
mainly published in offi cial and private case journals. We went back as early as possible. 
The different journals were founded at different times. The structure of the cases and the 
starting date of publication can be found in Table 2 below.
24  The Act on Electronic Freedom of Information (Act XC. of 2005. § 16.) introduced the 
Collection of Judicial Decisions, and publication was started in 2007. Recently the Act on the 
Organisation and Administration of Courts (Act CLXI. of 2011. § 163.) is regulating the issue. 
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Table 2. Edited decisions, “precedents” – Cited documents
Type of edited case Issuer of 
decisions
Publisher Start date of 
collection
Number of 
decisions in 
total
Uniformity Decisions (UD) Supreme Court Offi cial 1999 (1977) 169
Chamber Opinions (CO) Supreme Court Offi cial 1975 1,162
Principal Decisions of the Curia (PD) Supreme Court Offi cial 1999 2,441
Court Decisions of the Curia (CD) Supreme Court Offi cial 1975 20,118
Decisions from Collection of Court 
Decisions Journal (CCD) 
Appellate 
Courts
Private 2002 2,722
Decisions from Administrative and 
Business Cases Collection (ABC) 
Supreme Court Private 1992 5,636
Constitutional Court Decisions (CC) Constitutional 
Court
Offi cial 1990 2,870
Total    35,118
The main issuer of precedents is the Supreme Court. It regularly publishes four types 
of documents.
The fi rst is the Uniformity Decision (UD) (before 1997 these had different names, 
[Elvi döntés]) which decided a controversial legal question that had led to confl icting 
decisions in lower courts. The UD is formulated like a decision, and – apart from some rare 
examples – it only decides the debated legal question. This form of decision has a binding 
power on lower courts.
The second, third and fourth types are non-binding explanatory documents. The second 
type is the Chamber Opinion (CO) which is a special type of document unknown outside 
the post-communist world. These are general, abstract rulings of the professional branches 
within the departments of Curia, which are passed by the body of judges working in the 
same chamber. Chamber Opinions have great importance in the Hungarian legal system. 
These quasi-norms do not decide one particular restricted legal problem, but normally they 
deal with a set of controversial legal questions within a fi eld of law (such as problems of 
cases regarding joint property or the legal aspects of libel cases). Though these acts have no 
legal binding power, courts do follow and use them.
Finally, the third and the fourth type contain two sub-types of “precedents”. Both are 
individual cases selected from the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court as a Court of 
Cassation. The third type is a normal decision, called a court decision (CD), while the other 
is selected because of its “principal importance” (Principal decision – PD). Both of these 
are individual decisions, and restricted to one particular legal question.
All of the abovementioned types of documents are published in the offi cial journal of 
the Supreme Court (Decisions of the Curia – Kúriai Döntések, formerly Bírósági 
Határozatok, BH).
Private publishers also publish decisions. There are two infl uential journals: the 
Collection of Court Decisions (CCD), containing some 400 cases per year, and the 
Administrative and Business Cases Collection (ABC), with around the same amount.
Besides the abovementioned types, there is one additional “precedent type” which is 
frequently cited, which is the decisions of the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional 
Court was established in 1989, and currently publishes about 100 decisions per year. It has 
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its own offi cial journal, but the most important decisions are also published in the Offi cial 
Gazette (Magyar Közlöny).
All of the abovementioned decision types (except constitutional court decisions) have 
one thing in common: they have an edited headnote, which is typically one or two (in the 
cases of UD, PD, CD, CCD or ABC) or more (in the case of CO 5-15) amendments. These 
amendments are formulated like rules of an Act.
3.3. The results
3.3.1. The frequency of citations, court levels, branches, document types
The fi rst simple question observed was that of how many of the citing documents (unedited 
judgments) contain any citations, and references to any edited decisions. We created tables 
per court level, and per branch.
Table 3a. Citations to edited precedents per branch, fi gures
Total 
published
UD CO PD CD CCD ABC CC Total 
containing 
citation
Civil branch 26,881 326 4,370 1,449 4,727 1,440 88 1,734 9,868
Business branch 9,026 314 812 728 1,565 799 42 75 2,685
Labor branch 3,053 50 502 323 1,043 12 8 119 1,634
Administrative branch 14,602 267 1,928 347 926 19 393 517 3,604
Penal branch 7,950 564 600 142 1,251 9 4 114 2,202
All branches total 61,512 1,521 8,212 2,989 9,512 2,279 535 2,559 19,993*
* while fi gures in UD, CO, etc. columns indicate number of links (references), this column indicates 
number of documents, and therefore it is not the sum of the preceding columns
Table 3b. Citations to edited precedents per branch, percentages
UD CO PD CD CCD ABC CC Total 
containing 
citation
Civil branch 1% 16% 5% 18% 5% 0% 6% 37%
Business branch 3% 9% 8% 17% 9% 0% 1% 30%
Labor branch 2% 16% 11% 34% 0% 0% 4% 54%
Administrative branch 2% 13% 2% 6% 0% 3% 4% 25%
Penal branch 7% 8% 2% 16% 0% 0% 1% 28%
All courts total 2% 13% 5% 15% 4% 1% 4% 33%*
* while fi gures in UD, CO, etc. columns indicate number of links (references), this column indicates 
number of documents, and therefore it is not the sum of the preceding columns
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Table 4a. Citations to edited precedents per court, fi gures
Total 
published
UD CO PD CD CCD ABC CC Total 
containing 
citation
Curia 13,867 361 1,052 708 2,659 115 190 386 4,428
Appellate courts 17,331 574 2,643 1,094 3,324 1,205 90 947 6,503
County courts 27,590 554 4,295 1,106 3,224 900 249 1,183 8,454
Local courts 2,724 32 222 81 305 59 6 43 608
61,512 1,521 8,212 2,989 9,512 2,279 535 2,559 19,993
Table 4b. Citations to edited precedents per court, percentages
 Total 
published
UD CO PD CD CCD ABC CC Total ratio 
of documents 
containing 
citations
Curia 13,867 3% 8% 5% 19% 1% 1% 3% 32%
Appellate courts 17,331 3% 15% 6% 19% 7% 1% 5% 38%
County courts 27,590 2% 16% 4% 12% 3% 1% 4% 31%
Local courts 2,724 1% 8% 3% 11% 2% 0% 2% 22%
 61,512 2% 13% 5% 15% 4% 1% 4% 33%
3.3.2. Relative popularity of the precedent types
We created one additional simple fi gure. We wanted to know the “impact factor” of the 
individual precedent types. For this, we simply divided the number of citations into different 
precedent types by the total number of all (cited) documents available in databases. (Table 8 
represents Table 7a totals divided by Table 2 totals).
Table 5. Impact of different precedent types
 Number of 
decisions in total
Number of 
documents citing 
the decision type
Impact ratio
(%)
Uniformity Decisions (UD) 169 1,521 9
Chamber Opinions 1,162 8,212 7,1
Principal Decisions of the Curia 2,441 2,989 1,2
Court Decisions of the Curia (CD) 20,118 9,512 0,5
Decision from Collection of Court Decisions 
Journal (CCD) – Journal of Appellate Courts 
(private collection)
2,722 2,279 0,8
Decision from Administrative and Business 
Cases Collection (ABC) – private collection
5,636 535 0,1
Constitutional Court Decisions 2,870 2,559 0,9
Total 35,118 27,607
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3.3.3. Conclusions from Tables 3–5.
We can see that one-third of the published 61,512 judgments contain a citation to previous 
cases. But this overall fi gure varies both by branch and court level.
Regarding the court level, the Curia and county courts are on the average, while 
appellate courts are above this average and local courts fall below. The higher number of 
the appellate courts comes from citations to their own decisions published in their own 
journal (CCD), published by a private publisher. They cite the decisions of the Curia more 
frequently than lower courts, or than the Curia itself. This surplus is also generated by all 
branches of the appellate courts. Inserting the documents of the Curia into the decisions 
often serves as a tool of compliance with the upper courts.
An analysis per branch shows an even greater dispersion of citation frequency. The 
labor branch tops the list with its 50% frequency, followed by the other two civil branches. 
Penal law is the fourth on the list, while administrative law scores lowest. But if we examine 
the branches together with the court level, the picture is more mixed, because the number of 
citations fl uctuates across the court levels. For example, the number of citations in the penal 
branch at the Curia is quite high, even higher than in civil law branches, and this surplus is 
comprised of all precedent types equally. Uniformity decisions, for example, are very 
popular authorities at the Curia, and cited with signifi cantly more frequency when compared 
with other branches.
An obvious explanation could be that differences are caused mainly by the civil law–
public law distinction. Rules are typically dispositive in civil law, and cogent in public law 
branches, and in penal law the nullum crimen sine lege principle further restricts the 
available interpretative and argumentative space of the judge. But the Curia’s citation 
activism in the penal fi eld seems to contradict this assumption. Another explanation could 
be that in penal law, the space for interpretation and the possibility to rely on precedents 
remains under the monopoly of the Curia, which is reinforcing its own practice.
All tables show the popularity of different precedent types as well. Court Decisions 
(CD) are the most popular case types referenced. We can fi nd a citation to this type of 
precedents in 20% of all cases on average, and more than the half of all citations are CD 
citations. Here there is a sharp difference: upper courts (Curia, appellate courts) cite around 
25% of CDs, while lower courts (the county and local courts) around 15% of CDs. But 
within the lower courts – especially the county courts – this lower percentage is 
counterbalanced by the more frequent reference to Chamber Opinions. Lower courts use 
COs more frequently than individual precedent-types.
It further deepens the picture if we look at the relative importance (impact) of the 
precedent types. Here I used a very simple number: the impact is 1 if one decision is cited 
in one document. Uniformity decision’s impact number of 9 is not surprising: this is the 
only obligatory instrument. But Chamber Opinion’s high impact value (7.1) shows that this 
a very widely used and popular document type. What is surprising is that privately published 
CCDs have the same high impact ratio, which is even higher than the CD’s impact ratio. 
The explanation is that courts more willingly cite fresher decisions. The nearly 10,000 CDs 
majority are overlooked.25
25  I have a chart on the age of the cited precedents too. For reference, see: ZĘdi (2014) 42. 
http://jog.tk.mta.hu/uploads/fi les/mtalwp/2014_01_Zodi_Zsolt.pdf
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3.3.4. The change of citations of precedents in time
Table 6. Number of total judgments and citing documents between 2007 and 2012
Values
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total
Total Citing Total Citing Total Citing Total Citing Total Citing Total Citing Total Citing
Curia 931 231 2,255 576 2,547 717 2,772 948 2,905 981 2,457 882 13,867 4,335
Appellate Courts 1,477 452 2,918 963 3,021 1,069 3,435 1,275 3,776 1,435 2,704 1,153 17,331 6,347
County Courts 4,955 1,366 5,648 1,613 6,031 1,822 5,809 2,024 4,169 1,495 978 399 27,590 8,719
Local Courts 754 161 666 147 631 151 422 88 223 33 28 4 2,724 584
Total 8,117 2,210 11,487 3,299 12,230 3,759 12,438 4,335 11,073 3,944 6,167 2,438 61,512 19,985
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Table 7. Changes of documents containing citations in percentage per court level
Percentages
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total
Curia 25% 26% 28% 34% 34% 36% 31%
Appellate Courts 31% 33% 35% 37% 38% 43% 37%
County Courts 28% 29% 30% 35% 36% 41% 32%
Local Courts 21% 22% 24% 21% 15% 14% 21%
Total 27% 29% 31% 35% 36% 40% 32%
Chart to Table 7
3.3.5. Conclusions to Tables 6–7.
These tables show a clear picture. Apart from local courts26, the number of citations used in 
Hungarian court decisions is increasing over time. The growth is a minimum of 1% yearly, 
but in some years 2–4%. The difference between the court levels stays stable. We have no 
26  The published judgments of the local courts are not representative, and especially not from 
years 2011 and 2012. The reason is two-fold: 1. The publication mechanism of the court website. The 
main rule is that the fi nal judgments of the Curia and the Appellate Courts should be published, 
together with the connected fi rst (and in case of supervisory – cassation - decisions of the Curia, 
second) instance decisions. In case of normal appellate (fi nal) decisions of the appellate courts, the 
fi rst instance is the county court. Therefore, from this pile there is no local court decision at all from 
the database. Local court decisions can get into the database if a second instance fi nal county court 
decision is attacked in a supervisory (cassation) procedure at the Curia, and it is published as a 
background to its cassation decision, as the fi rst instance decision. 2. Furthermore, as local decisions 
are the fi rst decisions in time, and the average time of procedure is 1–1,5 years, a cassation decision 
of the Curia published in 2012 is typically a fi nished case that began in 2010 at a local court. This is 
the reason why there are so few local court decisions from 2011 and 2012. 
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data from the previous years, but I assume this was the picture before the start of the 
database.
This growth has something to do with the change in attitudes of judges and parties 
towards the precedents, and I assume this is a self-reinforcing process. The availability of 
decisions, precedents, cases, and especially the increasingly effective search engines and 
publication methods27 are generating more and more citations to precedents. The parties 
want to win the case, and reasoning with previous cases is one tool for this. If a party cites 
a precedent, the counterparty should also argue with something, and the judges must 
somehow refl ect on the citations. More published decisions result in more citations, and the 
habit of frequent citation involves a greater need for publishing more cases.
3.3.6. The impact of fi elds of law, and sub-fi elds of law to citations of precedents
One of our hypotheses was that the fi eld of law (case type) strongly infl uences the precedent 
intensity and that there is a great difference between case types. The following table 
presents the number of citations to precedents per fi eld of law (case type) in one branch, as 
an illustration.28 (The results of other branches are not signifi cantly different from this.) We 
prepared statistics only for the most frequent case types. Within one row, on the left side, 
there are 7 entries, namely the total number of judgments within the database (column 2) 
and the number of precedent-citing documents within the fi eld (column 3) followed by the 
number of citing documents per precedent type (columns 4–8). The right part of the table 
shows some ratios, like the percentage of citing documents within the whole (column 9 – 
column 3 divided by column 2) and the percentage of the citing documents per precedent 
type within citing documents (columns 10–14 – columns 4–8 divided by column 3). All of 
the 5 tables are sorted by the ratio of citing documents (column 9).
27  In the most widely used legal databases the important case-types (in some, all case types 
except CC), can be inserted into the text of the law, visually offering a connected case. 
28 We prepared these tables for all departments and branches, but, because the overall picture is 
very much the same there, I do not insert these tables. For these see the Hungarian working paper of 
this research, ZĘdi (2014) 33–38.
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Table 8. Number of precedent types and ratios per case type at the civil department
Civil department
 Total 
judgments
Judgments 
with citations 
to precedents
UD CO PD CD CC Ratio of 
citing 
documents
Ratio of 
UD
Ratio of 
CO
Ratio of 
PD
Ratio of 
CD
Ratio of 
CC
Libel cases 958 788 10 2,327 17 136 576 82% 1% 295% 2% 17% 73%
Termination of 
joint property
583 320 5 611 13 173 1 55% 2% 191% 4% 54% 0%
Infringement of 
personal rights
2,588 1,377 10 1,310 289 1,051 1,686 53% 1% 95% 21% 76% 122%
Invalidity of 
contract
1,724 761 229 458 276 1,032 25 44% 30% 60% 36% 136% 3%
Determination of 
ownership
1,004 426 125 310 71 466 60 42% 29% 73% 17% 109% 14%
Payment of 
contractual price
370 145 8 42 23 175 0 39% 6% 29% 16% 121% 0%
Damage caused 
while exercising 
public powers
542 171 9 84 48 179 34 32% 5% 49% 28% 105% 20%
Damage 
compensation 
(Torts)
5,903 1,564 181 897 372 1,253 385 26% 12% 57% 24% 80% 25%
Repayment of 
loan
840 187 19 81 56 178 7 22% 10% 43% 30% 95% 4%
Total 14,512 5,739 596 6,120 1,165 4,643 2,774 40% 10% 107% 20% 81% 48%
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3.3.6. Conclusions from the quantitative research
Above, at III.3., I showed that the court level and department have an impact on the use of 
precedents (upper courts and private law branches cite more frequently than any others).
Table 11 provides further information on this.
The fi rst visible phenomenon is that though the civil branch shows a higher citation 
rate, the distribution is extreme: there are some case types where the citation ratio is 90%, 
while there are some where it is around 20%. (The dispersion rate in the public law branches 
is not so high, since the highest and the lowest rates in administrative courts are 40% and 
14%, respectively, and in the penal law branches, these fi gures are 37% and 19%, 
respectively.)
This means that there are case types where practically every decision is citing a 
precedent.
It is even more interesting to observe this together with the precedent types that the 
courts are citing. Since there is an obligatory document (the Uniformity Decision), which is 
offi cially more important than other types, one would think that this is the most frequent 
citation type, but that is not the case. In certain case types, there are no citations at all to 
UDs. This could be for a number of reasons.
One is that the number of UDs is low and the “corpus” is casuistic: UD’s don’t exist in 
certain areas of law at all.
Another reason becomes visible if we observe Constitutional Court decisions (CC 
column 8), in which there are extreme citation rates both in the positive and in the negative 
ranges. Here the cause is visible: all the case types in which constitutional court decisions 
are popular have some (or a great) connection with the basic rights – e.g., libel cases (73%) 
and infringement of personal rights (122%) in the civil branch, broadcasting cases in the 
administrative branch (107%) and defamation in the penal branch (138%).
A third reason is that if a certain precedent type is extremely popular, then the citation 
ratio of other types drops. It seems that the precedent types are interchangeable. This is a 
surprising fact, since these types are legally, and in their form, very different. As I indicated 
above, it is obligatory for courts to conform to Uniformity Decisions (UDs). This is not the 
case with Chamber Opinions (COs), but these are longer in text, and they comprise a 
broader legal topic (such as a legal act). Court Decisions (CDs) are, in format, very similar 
to Principal Decisions, and Uniformity Decisions, but their number is very high (as they 
decide one particular, narrow legal dilemma). But this all seems unimportant for everyday 
practice. The authority of a decision is independent from its intended “legal force” or from 
its place in the hierarchy of decisions. However, it seems that if there is a Chamber Opinion, 
courts prefer this: this is the situation in joint property cases (191%), libel cases (295%), 
personal rights infringement cases (95%) – these are all fi elds, where there is a “strong” 
Chamber Opinion. Where there is no CO, the practice uses CD and PD in the second place. 
Constitutional Court decisions are cited independently from the Supreme Court acts, and in 
that fi eld we do not see this correlation.
In Chapter IV, I will analyze the context of the citations, and other qualitative features, 
but it is important to note that Chamber Opinions are the kind of documents that are closer 
in format and wording to the structure and logic of a traditional code. They are really law-
like tools.
However this is only a numeric starting point, and does nothing to answer our initial 
question, which is whether citations raise the quality of reasoning. As with all statistical 
fi gures, these should be interpreted together with the results of qualitative research.
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4. THE QUALITATIVE RESEARCH
4.1. Methodology
Though the number, structure and dispersion of the citations to precedents already can tell a 
lot about the use of precedents, the precedential character of a legal system cannot be 
analyzed only by automatic, statistical tools. Therefore, I selected a random sample from 
the decisions of the Capital Appellate Court (Appellate level) and the Supreme Court 
(Curia).
The sample contains 520 upper court cases (with the preceding case), which were 
broken down as follows:
Table 9. Cases observed in the qualitative research
Year of case Capital Appellate Court Curia Total
2007 19 29 48
2008 36 61 97
2009 34 81 115
2010 38 49 87
2011 38 78 116
2012 32 25 57
Total 197 323 520
We then fi lled out an Excel spreadsheet, with the following data:
1. The subject of the decision
2. Citations
3. History of the case (affi rmed, dismissed, modifi ed)
4. The value of the case (if applicable)
5. Treatment of the cited precedent (followed, distinguished, overruled)
6. Treatment of citations of the lower court decision in appellate decision (ignore them, 
use them, or cite a new one.)
7. Who cited fi rst the decision? (court or parties, if available)
The fi rst two points are the same that were observed also in the quantitative research, 
and we only wanted to check the statistical data with manual tools. All other parameters can 
be explored only after reading the text of the judgments.
4.2. Some remarks on the style of the decisions (demonstration, inference, justifi cation, 
reasoning)
One of the conclusions of the qualitative survey was that, in most of the cases, the 
precedents are cited very formally and mechanically. Sometimes even the text of the 
headnote is missing and only the number of the case is cited (“The court took the CD No. 
…. into consideration”), but in most of the cases courts are only citing the headnote of the 
cases as if these were texts of a statute. We have no exact data on this, but my estimation is 
that the great majority of the citations (more than 90%) either contain a headnote as a 
quotation, or parts of (sentences from) the headnote without an explicit quotation, and less 
than 10% of the citations quote anything from the reasoning. As we will see later even if the 
case is distinguished, it is done with a stereotypical introductory formula (“The court has 
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not taken the Court Decision No. … into consideration, because its facts are different from 
the recent case”). If the court analyses the reasoning, its reasoning is no longer than one 
paragraph, but rather typically a sentence.
Moreover courts do not do two things. First, they do not see and use the precedents as 
a network of arguments. I have seen only one case (out of the 520) where a whole chain of 
arguments was developed in a case-law-like way. This case was one applying EU law, and 
analyzed the jurisdiction of the General Court of the EU. Furthermore, courts do not 
reformulate the ratio decidendi of the case in order to adapt it to the case in hand, as, for 
example, English courts often do. The justifi cation of an average Hungarian decision seems 
like a logical operation, where the judgment (conclusion) is shown as a logical consequence 
of the facts, and the text of law.
4.3. Results of the qualitative research
4.3.1. Value of the case
Table 10. The value of the case, and the citations
Value All judgements Number of citations %
Small (under 1M HUF) 220 55 25
Medium (between 1 and 10 M HUF) 126 36 29
Big (more than 10M HUF) 71 22 31
Undetermined29 103 184 179
Total 520 297 57
One of our hypotheses was that the value of the case – the money at stake – has an 
effect on the reasoning effort employed by the parties and that this infl uences the number of 
citations. This is not justifi able. Though the number of citations increases slightly as the 
value grows, this is not the decisive factor: the frequency of citations is determined mostly 
by the fi eld of law or the case type in question.
4.3.2. Distinguishing
Table 11. Number of precedents distinguished
Number of decisions 520
Contains citation 157
Number of all citations 297
Precedent followed 283
Precedent distinguished 14
It is not surprising, and it partly follows from the above mentioned facts, that 95% of 
precedents are cited in an affi rmative, i.e. positive, context. If the court is distinguishing the 
29 Most of the “undetermined value” cases are: criminal, administrative (where the subject of 
the case is the supervision of a decision of a state organ), or labor (where e.g. the illicit termination of 
the labor contract is in question), or infringement of personal rights. The latter two are very precedent-
intensive – that is why the undetermined group has the highest citation ratio. 
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case, it does so in a very mechanical way, mostly using the same stereotypical phrases, like 
“the facts in case XXX are different; therefore, the holding should not be applied in this 
case”. We have not found any cases where there was an explicit overruling.
4.3.3. Treatment of citations by the lower court
Table 12. Treatment of citations of the lower courts in the context of the history of the 
case
Number of decisions 520
Contains citation 157
Number of all citations by the upper court 297
Number of all citations by the lower court 104
Citations mentioned in a positive context by the upper court 51
“Agreement ratio” in precedents 49%
Number affi rmed cases 377
Affi rmation ratio 73%
As was previously stated, lower courts cite fewer precedents than upper courts. In our 
sample, we found 297 citations in 520 judgments vs. 104 citations by the lower courts. The 
surprising result of the table is that typically the upper courts do not cite the same precedents 
as lower courts. Of the 297 citations made by the upper courts, only 51 were also used/cited 
by the lower courts. Or, to put it another way, only half of the citations used/made by the 
lower courts are also cited by the upper courts at appeal; another 246 totally different 
citations are inserted in the second (third) instance. Thus, typically the story is that if the 
lower court uses two citations, one is ignored, the second retained, and another two are 
newly inserted. This number is even more surprising if we compare it with the affi rmation 
ratio of the upper courts, which is 73% overall.
4.3.4. By whom is the precedent cited and brought into the argumentation?
Table 13. By whom the precedent was brought into the reasoning
At lower courts
By the court 83 80%
By the parties 21 20%
Total 104 100%
At upper courts
By the lower court, and the upper court agrees 51 17%
By the upper court 190 64%
Parties 56 19%
Total 297 100%
An important question for us was who had introduced the citation into the procedure. 
Who initiated the use of a precedent? Unfortunately, we did not fi nd a clear answer to this. 
In most of the cases there is no sign of the source. In other cases the court indicates that this 
was proposed by the party (“Defendant cited the CD No ……,”) or was used by the lower 
147CITATIONS OF PREVIOUS DECISIONS AND THE QUALITY OF JUDICIAL REASONING
court (“The fi rst instance court cited properly CD No….”). For this particular question, to 
get a better picture, the text of the petitions should have been studied too.
4.4.Final conclusions
Precedents seem to be an important part of the legal reasoning of the Hungarian courts, and 
the number of citations of precedents is signifi cantly increasing over time (from 27% to 
40%, between 2007 and 2012; on average 33%).30 If trends continue, within a few years 
more than half of all decisions will contain a precedent citation.
However, this data in itself is slightly misleading. If we analyze this fact in light of the 
other results and observations, it will become clear that the way in which Hungarian courts 
are citing previous decisions is simply not increasing the quality of reasoning. Citations 
have no direct effect on the quality of reasoning.
First, courts, even if they cite precedents, do so in a formal way. This means the 
following: courts almost exclusively cite the offi cial headnotes of the decisions, and it is 
very rare that they cite anything else. Therefore they do not analyze the previous case, do 
not try to build up a reasoning upon it, but simply mention it as a premissa maior of a 
logical subsumption. This is very similar to the use of the law texts in some continental 
legal cultures. In Hungary judicial reasoning – refl ecting the long-standing tradition of civil 
law systems – is not a rhetorical effort, but shows itself as a logical process.
Second, there is neither distinguishing, nor any other sophisticated approach to a case 
used, as we can see in section IV.3.2. Rather, the approach of courts to cases is binary. If the 
case cited by the party does not fi t the “inference” of the court, the court simply ignores it, 
and will not waste time explaining why. If it fi ts, the court will cite it like an amendment of 
a law. The overwhelming popularity of Chamber Decisions, which regulate a particular 
fi eld of law, and their statute-like wording illustrates this tendency.
Third, the number of citations is mainly determined by the fi eld of law, and neither the 
value of the case, nor the complexity of the legal issue has any signifi cance. In other words, 
judges are not using previous cases when they are struggling with a complicated legal issue, 
rather they simply mechanically follow certain patterns.
Fourth, citations to previous cases demonstrate that the judgment fi ts into a professional 
“seamless web”. Quality means different things for different target groups and audiences. 
For example, for the general public moral arguments are more important than demonstrating 
professional quality. Citations to previous cases could be important for the legal community, 
or for the parties’ counsels. There are strong arguments31 that judges in their decisions in 
Hungarian courts are mainly speaking to the upper court, and not to the legal community.
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